













ABSTRACT: Advances in agricultural biotechnology have led to inter-
est by agribusiness to license elite germplasm from national programs
in developing countries, now in need of funds. Uncertainties about the
value of the material have delayed negotiations. This article proposes a
method of setting upper (monopoly; no seed saving) and lower
(competitive) negotiating bounds on values. The model accounts for (1)
annual productivity enhancements, (2) effects on world prices, and (3)
obsolescence effects of greater R&D. A demonstration application for
soybeans in Brazil, which has completed the preconditions (IPR,
biosafety, internal policy), suggests limited private value for public
germplasm. The optimal solution is cooperation (licensing).
INTRODUCTION
Agricultural biotechnology is largely a U.S. creation. The original Cohen–Boyer
transformation techniques were developed there, the private sector made its major
initial investments there, and the U.S. government adopted the ﬁrst comprehen-
sive regulatory system (in 1986 and 1990). It was no surprise the ﬁrst transgenic
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acreage of genetically modiﬁed crops leads the world (James, 1999).
With this level of U.S. market dominance, the current focus of agri-biotech-
nology ﬁrms has been on expanding sales to overseas markets. Sharp opposition
to genetically engineered foods has limited the potential in the EU so that, instead,
attention has focused on developing countries. The target countries are those with
large commercial agricultural sectors relatively free of governmental control. The
larger Latin American nations ﬁt this scenario, with Argentina already a major
participant. An obvious second target nation is Brazil, the largest nation in Latin
America geographically and second worldwide in soybean exports. This article
uses as an example efforts, particularly by Pharmacia (formerly Monsanto), to sell
bioengineered soybean products in Brazil using Brazilian soybean germplasm.
We consider one aspect of the technology marketing process—a means for
governments to identify the value of elite germplasm as the delivery vehicle for
GMO’s technologies.
In a broader context, the issues considered here are not limited to a single
country or ﬁrm—the identiﬁcation of Brazil and Pharmacia is done solely to
provide a context and motivation for the model building. Moreover, the pricing of
developing country genetic resources, too, is broadly applicable to pharmaceuti-
cals and cosmetics, among other products. However, the structure of the model as
presented here to include periodic improvements (successive new varieties) limits
its application to agricultural products.
Soybean Production in Brazil
Following 50 years of an inward-focused economy, sweeping economic
reforms were implemented in Brazil in 1994. Over the next several years, the
economy grew strongly, but in January 1999 the real plunged by 40%. The direct
consequence for agriculture has been to make Brazil highly competitive on world
markets. However, budget cutting extended to the Brazilian Agricultural Research
Corporation (Embrapa), the research arm of the Ministry of Agriculture, which
recently was mandated to raise some 30% of its own revenues (Hudson, 1998;
World Bank, 2000) compared with 10% previously.
Brazil produces about 30 million tons and exports an equivalent of 19 million
tons of beans. Brazil holds 23% of the world market for (soy) beans (second to the
U.S.), 29% for meal (ﬁrst), and 19% for oil (second to Argentina) (USDA-Foreign
Agricultural Service and ABIOVE).
For the past 20 years, Embrapa has released on average two soybean varieties
a year, equivalent to one for each major (central and southern) region (Warnken,
1999). A sizeable private seed sector also exists; Pharmacia bought some local soy
breeding programs, forming its own breeding and seed company called Monsoy.
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offerings.
Only one Embrapa research center, CENARGEN (National Research Center
for Genetic Resources and Biotechnology), with an annual budget of about $1.8
million, has responsibility for biotechnology research. Embrapa employed 61
professional personnel at the National Soybean Research Center in 1995,
compared with 156 in the U.S. in 1994 (101 private, 55 public) (Warnken, 1999;
Frey, 1996).
Given this relatively small budget, the decision was made to access externally
developed technologies when available. Thus, technologies applicable to soy-
beans are to be accessed rather than redeveloped, and Pharmacia is an obvious
source for those technologies. This article addresses the issue of the terms of any
agreement with Pharmacia, but ﬁrst it must be determined if the property rights
and regulatory arrangements are in place to satisfy the needs of the private sector.
Brazilian IPR, Regulations, and Technology Transfer Agreements
As part of the 1994 economic reforms directed to attracting foreign investment,
and to comply with Brazil’s commitments under the TRIPs (Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) appendix to the WTO (World Trade
Organization), a number of sweeping changes have been made in property rights
legislation and biotechnology in recent years. Here, only those applicable to
accessing seed-based technologies will be highlighted.
Patents
The Brazilian patent law was revised in 1996 (Law No. 9.279). Following the
minimum requirements of TRIPs, patents are not permitted for plants or animals.
However, the law is silent on whether gene constructs can be patented (a silence
found in most countries). At the same time, a “pipeline” clause (Article 229)
applies “to all applications pending” which had received patent protection in other
countries. Pharmacia and other ﬁrms were thus able to patent soybean technolo-
gies in Brazil.
Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBR)
A Brazilian PBR law (No. 9,456) was passed in 1997 following the 1978 Act
of UPOV (International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants). Although the Brazilian law follows the 1978 Act in most respects, it does
incorporate the “essentially derived” component of the 1991 Act (Article 14.5).
Essential derivation establishes a hierarchical dependency situation whereby a
variety identiﬁed as “essentially derived” cannot be commercialized without the
permission of the owner of the initial variety. Among the ways that a variety may
be judged as “essentially derived” is transformation by genetic engineering. That
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soybean variety using its technologies, the resultant material could not legally be
commercialized without permission from Embrapa. Embrapa used a ‘pipeline-
like’ clause to protect previously released varieties on adoption of the PBR
legislation. PBR clariﬁes the ownership of these improved materials. For purposes
here, it is assumed that Embrapa has the necessary legal rights to sell the products
of its breeding programs.
Biosafety
Most countries require an assessment for environmental safety before the full
commercial release of genetically modiﬁed crops. Brazil adopted a national
biosafety law in 1995. An early application was for bioengineered glyphosate
resistant soybeans.
Food safety is an additional important consideration, but as humans and
animals worldwide react uniformly to the same food toxins, it is an accepted
practice to allow a granting of food safety based on an approved application
elsewhere in the world.
Embrapa Intellectual Property Rights Policy
In the totally public sector environment that prevailed until recently in
Brazilian agriculture, there was no need for policies on ownership and relation-
ships with the private sector. Recent internal and external factors have, however,
changed that, indicating the need for speciﬁc policies covering public/private
sector relationships (Sampaio and Brito da Cunha, 1999). Embrapa in 1995
adopted a general policy including, among others, the objective of maximizing the
returns from assets produced by the research program, when not conﬂicting with
Embrapa’s social mission. A recent (September 1998) implementation step has
been the establishment of an “Intellectual Property Secretariat” with responsibility
to negotiate access rights with Pharmacia and other private sector ﬁrms for the use
of Embrapa varieties (see Maredia, Erbisch, and Sampaio, 2000).
Objectives
All the components are in place: (1) Pharmacia is motivated to license Embrapa
soybean varieties as the best delivery vehicle for its herbicide resistant technol-
ogies; (2) Embrapa is looking to such agreements as a source of self-funding for
research; and (3) intellectual property and food and bio-safety regulations are in
place to protect investors, the public, and the environment.
Although much of this has been true for several years, no agreement has yet
been reached. One complicating factor, according to those familiar with Embrapa,
has been a fundamental uncertainty within Embrapa of the value of its varieties
and possible effects on public welfare, leading to reluctance to complete an
394 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 3/4/2001agreement. Here we develop those aspects speciﬁcally for the licensing of
soybean varieties in Brazil.
The speciﬁc objectives are twofold: (1) develop a general conceptual model for
the valuation of licensed germplasm, and (2) provide preliminary estimates of the
upper and lower bounds for the value of soybean germplasm in Brazil. The model
is intended to be general, while the preliminary ﬁgures can subsequently be
modiﬁed as needed for negotiation purposes. The model is sufﬁcient to establish
minimum and maximum values only with any ﬁnal agreed value expected to fall
between those limits.
The ﬁgures developed herein, while approximate, are for demonstrative
purposes only and should not be taken to represent current market values. An
actual application would also likely include sensitivity analysis that is excluded
here because of the demonstration role of our application. Furthermore, the
numbers are all deterministic so that any risk premium sought by either party
would be an aspect of the negotiation. The rapid and monotonically rising
adoption of herbicide resistant soybeans in the U.S. through 2000 does suggest
there are no unexpected issues with growing (as contrasted with market accep-
tance of) these products (see McBride and Brooks, 1999 for an overview of survey
evidence on the U.S. experience).
MODEL
An agricultural biotechnology product combining genetically engineered genes
with elite cultivars creates a classic joint product valuation problem—how to
determine the value contributed by each component? Here we develop a model
designed to do just that, while considering relevant seed market characteristics,
particularly that (1) variety price is associated with the net productivity enhance-
ment of the new variety, and (2) the availability of improved (next generation)
varieties reduces the market for older varieties. The model functions by estab-
lishing high and low price points, with an exchange price expected to be
negotiated between those extremes. It is, in general, not possible to determine the
exchange price as it depends on the market power balance between the component
suppliers, as well as calculations of market shares should the varieties compete in
the market.
Speciﬁcally, the model must allow for the following:
1. Productivity enhancement of new varieties, referred to here as k, a standard
increment for every new variety i. The k is as assessed by farmers compared
with previously available materials. That is, k may be the result of a new
attribute or, more commonly, the restoration (maintenance breeding) of
productivity that ebbed over time as pests and diseases evolved with a variety.
From a farmer’s perspective, any source of k is equivalent as a contribution
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trait (herbicide resistance in our soybean example) combined to create a GMO
are additive with no interactive effect on variety obsolescence. If there were
such an effect on obsolescence, then research costs would increase but the
basic model structure would be unchanged as the model operates as if new
seed were purchased annually. In a competitive market, a variety’s value is
associated with the net productivity enhancement, where productivity refers
to higher yields and/or lower production costs, and/or improved product
quality (such as higher oil content).
2. Calculation of the effects of productivity improvements on world supply and
prices.
3. Monopoly sales of a variety with no seed savings (as is possible to require
with patented plants or plant parts).
4. Recognition by ﬁrms of the effects of their own R&D efforts on the output
of new varieties and, through competition, on sales of existing (now
relatively less productive) varieties. Moreover, in concentrated markets,
ﬁrms will also be conscious of the R&D investments of competing ﬁrms.
Perfect Competition




pf~Q! 2 rQ 2 C~Q,Z!, (1)
where: p is output price, Q is quantity of input (seed), r is input (seed) price, and
C is all other input costs deﬁned as a function of seed quantity and other variables
Z. Assuming f() is concave in Q and C() is convex, the necessary and sufﬁcient
ﬁrst-order condition for a maximum is:
pf9~Q! 5 r 1
­C
­Q or r 5 pf9~Q! 2
­C
­Q (2)
This is just the standard notion of marginal value product equaling marginal cost
and ultimately provides the input price the ﬁrm (farmer) is willing to pay for the
seed. For simplicity, we can assume that at least over the relevant range of Q, that
output is proportional to input seed quantity (i.e., f9(Q) 5 f, a constant).
Now consider a perfectly competitive output market scheme, but as a result of
breeding or other technological change, productivity of the seed is enhanced by a
factor of k. The ﬁrst-order condition for the proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm for the new
seed variety i with productivity enhancement ki is:
396 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 3/4/2001pf9~Qi! z ~1 1 ki! 5 ri 1
­C
­Qi




where i corresponds to the improved variety. Thus, we have ri . r and the
difference is proportional to (11ki)-­C/­Qi. Intuitively this makes sense since the
ﬁrm (farmer) is now willing to pay more for the productivity-enhanced seed. For
simplicity, we shall assume that a “new variety” always corresponds to a
productivity increase of approximately k.
Monopoly Sales
Now, imagine the technological advancement produced as above, but with a
monopolist supplier of technology. This case would apply, for example, for
varieties that were protected by patents or (at national discretion) Plant Breeders’
Rights, and recognizing varietal improvement as a sequential process, r can be
thought of as a vector of sequential improvements. The monopolist ﬁrm will
recognize that the value of ri would decline in part as a consequence of the supply
of additional (i.e., subsequent) improved varieties, rj,j. i. That is, the farmer
would be willing to pay less for a variety today if sequential improved varieties
are forthcoming.
Strictly speaking, the last statement holds only if the crop can be used as a seed
source for subsequent seasons, something allowed under most national PBR laws,
but generally prohibited for patented materials. This suggests, in turn, different
models must be used for patented and PBR-protected varieties, a major compli-
cation. However, Hansen and Knudson (1996) have shown that seed companies
can appropriate most of the value for varieties used for multiple seasons, since
farmers are willing to pay a higher price initially for a multiseason variety than for
one used only once. Thus, if the marginal costs of producing and distributing seed
along with cash ﬂow considerations are ignored, for purposes here we can treat all
seeds as if they were purchased annually.
Now consider the marginal revenue of the monopolist technology ﬁrm, where
the monopolist can inﬂuence price (rj) by limiting release quantities of sequential
varieties (Qj). From total revenue, TR 5 rjQj, we can write marginal revenue as:
MR 5 rj 1
drj
dQj




rjD 5 rjS1 1
1
hD 5 rjS1 2
1
|h|D (4)
where h is the market demand elasticity for varietal improvement Qj [(dQj / drj)
(rj /Q j)]. Intuitively, this compares with the traditional-sense monopolist quantity
restriction, but here is interpreted as the restriction of the sale of forthcoming
varieties. Since we do not have market estimates of the demand elasticity for
innovation, it is decomposed into component parts, as follows.
First deﬁne e as the supply elasticity of innovation, where:








The elasticity of innovation can be interpreted as the relative percentage change
in sales of new varieties to a change in innovation effort (I), e . 0. This can be
thought of as a ﬁrm productivity characteristic, for example, the change in new
varieties relative to your research staff, or hours worked, ceterus paribus. This
elasticity is expected to vary across ﬁrms given the productivity of their scientists.
Next, we need to relate the price change in varieties to supply response and, as
will be shown, incorporate a varietal supply restriction in terms of the frequency










In contrast to e, the effort elasticity (d) can be thought of as a cost efﬁciency
characteristic of the monopolist ﬁrm which describes the change in effort level (to
develop more or fewer varieties per unit time) from a change in varietal prices. In
other words, holding all else constant, and given an expected change in price, a
relatively more cost-efﬁcient breeder of varieties would be willing to expend more
effort to develop subsequent varieties, thus implying more varieties produced per
unit of time. New varieties, however, reduce the commercial life of existing ones
so that, if ﬁrm i receives more for its product today, it would be willing to
contribute less effort for production of new varieties; hence d , 0. Because we do
not know levels of d for individual breeding ﬁrms, we assume a proxy variable for
this where udu is measured as the number of new varieties per unit of time; that is,
as d increases, ceterus paribus, the time increment between varieties should
decrease. Note that d applies to the breeder (Embrapa in our example), not to the
biotech ﬁrm supplying the specialized genes.
Returning to our monopolist technology supplying ﬁrm’s marginal revenue
function, by substitution we have:
MR 5 rjS1 1
1
edD 5 rjS1 2
1
e|d|D. (7)
Substituting these results into our ﬁrst-order conditions for the ﬁrm purchasing
the (seed) input Qj we have:
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Finally, consider the case where the technology supply industry is an
oligopsony, where ﬁrms are conscious of the actions and reactions of their
competitors. Innovation and effort elasticities can be deﬁned for a ﬁrm’s
competitors analogously to the above, except now the resulting impact on the
market demand elasticity varietal improvements is manifested in the resulting
relative relations between the competing ﬁrm’s innovation and effort elasticities.
To make this clearer, we introduce a little more notation. First deﬁne Ci to be the
total elasticity of varietal improvement, where, from above, Ci 5 eiudiu, and in the
case of the monopoly Ci [ uhu. Next let Vi be the total elasticity of varietal
improvement for ﬁrm i’s competitors; that is, what ﬁrm i conjectures to be his or
her competitor’s (say ﬁrm h) Ch. Thus, Vi 5C h 5 ehudhu. Finally, since the
resulting impact on the market is the relative contribution of both components, we
can infer: uhu[C i/Vi. Substituting this relationship into (8) we have:
rij 5







where i represents technology supplying ﬁrm i of variety j.
This relation makes intuitive sense. For instance, if ﬁrm i’s total varietal
elasticity is higher than a competitor’s, i’s varietal improvements are more
frequent on the market place and, ceterus paribus, should be worth relatively less
today to the proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms (farms) purchasing input Qij at rij. This total
elasticity concept then is derived from ﬁrm innovation and effort elasticities.
World Price Effects
To account for world price effects from productivity-enhanced supply shifts,
we adopt the methodology developed in Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995) for an
open-economy, exporter (large country) innovation, with no technology spill-
overs. We consider two markets, Brazil and rest of the world (ROW), with
horizontal shifts in supply from productivity enhancements. World price reduc-
tions are solved for based on linear supply and demand relationships, where
domestic supply is a function of price and the technology supply shifter, k. Other
supply and demand equations are functions of equilibrium world price only.
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productivity shifter), we use reasonable elasticity and productivity estimates. The
linear supply and demand trade model (see below) can then be used to derive
world price effects based on elasticities and export shares. Assuming the
pre-adoption prices, quantities, and relevant elasticities are known, and using the
trade equilibrium assumption, the absolute value of the relative change in price
(Z) can be expressed as:
Z 5 eAK/@eA 1 sAhA 1 ~1 2 sA!hEB#, (10)
where eA is the domestic (Brazil) supply elasticity, hA is the absolute value of the
domestic demand elasticity, hEB is the absolute value of the elasticity of ROW
excess demand (calculated based on ROW supply and demand, domestic exports,
and ROW demand and supply elasticities), sA is the share of domestic production
consumed domestically, and K is the vertical shift of the supply function
expressed as a proportion of the initial price. Assuming the use of variable or
quasi-ﬁxed inputs does not change to bring forth the projected yield increase, the
net cost change in time t, kt
*, can be estimated by using the productivity
enhancement (kt) as:
k* t 5 ~kt / eA!WPt21, (11)
where WP is world price. Finally, the relative shifts (K) in supply can be derived
as:
Kt 5 k* t / WPt. (12)
Producer and Consumer Surpluses
In addition to production, consumption, and world price effects, welfare effects
of the productivity enhancements (via changing world prices) are also calculated.
As derived in Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995), the changes in producer and
consumer surpluses can be calculated as:
DCSA,t 5 WPt21CA,t21Z~1 1 0.5ZhA!, (13)
DPSA,t 5 WPt21QA,t21~K 2 Z!~1 1 0.5ZeA!, (14)
DCSB,t 5 WPt21CB,t21Z~1 1 0.5ZhB!, and (15)
DPSB,t 5 WPt21QB,t21Z~1 1 0.5ZeB!, (16)
where DCS and DPS are changes in consumer and producer surpluses in time t,
respectively (A 5 Brazil, B 5 ROW), C is consumption in time t, and Q is
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by summing the producer and consumer surpluses.
ESTIMATES
We estimate the previous model, applied to soybean germplasm in Brazil. The
section ﬁrst presents the parameter values used, then the results using three
scenarios for the supply of transgenic soybean seeds: (a) Embrapa alone, (b)
Pharmacia alone, and (c) combined. Scenarios (a) and (b) represent the base
bargaining positions of Embrapa and Pharmacia respectively, while (c) represents
the beneﬁts to cooperation, thereby establishing the high and low values for the
two participants, and the bargaining range. We attempt to identify and ﬁt scenario
values that are reﬂective of ﬁeld conditions, but recognize that many other ﬁgures
could be used as well. Thus, we propose this section as more reﬂective of how the
model can be used than it is of establishing any value of direct use in negotiations.
Parameters and Starting Values
To assess the seed market and the values involved in the innovations, a trade
model was used to calculate the impact of a new seed variety on production and
therefore on world price (Eq. 10). The word price and quantities produced
determine farm revenues, and the value of the seed is related to its marginal
beneﬁts (Eq. 8). The seed price and quantities determine the revenues for the seed
industry. Calculations are based on aggregated and average data for the soybean
market. Elasticities, world price, imputed domestic share, and other parameters
are listed in Table 1. Production and consumption values for Brazil and ROW are
Table 1. Starting Values and Parameter Assumptions
Factor Value Source(s)
«A 0.85 Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995)
hA 0.03 Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995)
hEB 2.704 Heien and Pick (1991)
sA .35 Computed from USDA
«ES 1.37 Computed
« 3 Assumed for Embrapa alone
4 Assumed for Pharmacia alone
4 Cooperative (max. of two)
d 1 Embrapa (1/varietal release time
1/2)
.447 Pharmacia (1/varietal release time
1/2)
rj $36.32/ha USDA-Attache Reports
Qj .80 mt Computed from initial plantings of 11.9m ha. and seeding rate
Yield 2.3 mt/ha USDA-FAS
Seeding rate .067 mt/ha Greaser, 1991
dC/dQ $7677/mt Calculated costs from USDA and FECOTRIGO
($514/ha)
P $235/mt Initial World Price
Elite Germplasm for GMO’s in Brazil 401ﬁve-year average levels.
The calculation of production effects requires information on productivity of
the soybean varieties with and without herbicide resistance (discussed below), as
well as baseline prices and production costs. The initial seed demand in Brazil was
computed based on initial production, yields, and an assumed seeding rate of
0.067 mt/ha. The initial seed price was converted to $U.S. per metric ton for ease
of calculation in the simulation model, and can be converted readily to the more
familiar hectare basis. The average costs of production ($514/ha. excluding seed
costs) are used as an estimate for dC/dQ and were calibrated from the initial seed
price in the model to the actual assumed seed price in Table 1.
Table 1 contains no ex ante estimates of the supply elasticity of innovation (e)
and the own-price effort elasticity (d). This is because we lack data for computing
them, and instead resort to using ﬁtted values which give ‘reasonable’ starting
values for soybean seed prices and other results. It was assumed that innovation
elasticities are highly elastic while the own-price effort elasticity estimates were
calculated via the proxy measure explained above. Note also the assumption that
Embrapa releases new varieties each year, with a 1% productivity enhancement,
while Pharmacia’s technology provides a 4.7% productivity increase (James,
1998), but is released in new varieties only every ﬁve years because of costs and
regulatory requirements. If Pharmacia cannot license Embrapa’s newest releases,
then it must use those from Monsoy which are assumed to be ﬁve years behind
Embrapa’s in productivity. These assumptions are key in determining the results.
World price, consumption, and demand quantities were estimated annually
over a 20-year period. In addition, since the productivity-related supply shifts
affect the inherent elasticity estimates these were recalculated and adjusted over
the period as well.
Results
We estimate three scenarios as follows: (1) Embrapa alone, 100% current
market share, and 1% annual productivity increase. (This is the baseline scenario
reﬂecting the maximum Embrapa revenue under a proﬁt maximizing pricing
plan.); (2) Pharmacia alone, 100% Embrapa’s current market share, 4.7% initial
productivity increase starting 5 generations back, then 5% in ﬁve-year increments.
(This is Pharmacia’s maximum revenue with no cooperation.); (3) cooperative
scenario combining productivity increases with current generation. (This repre-
sents the maximum combined revenue that can be divided between Embrapa and
Pharmacia.)
Although the assumed parameter estimates and averaged supply and demand
levels are somewhat arbitrary, for purposes here, the important ﬁgures are the
differences among the estimates rather than the absolute levels. Each scenario is
estimated for a 20-year period, which allows for the different periodicity of the
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improvements. Values are then deﬂated to the present at a 5% rate. Table 2 reports
the scenario results for seed sales and prices.
Some explanatory notes will be helpful in interpreting these results. First, note
that Scenario 1 treats Embrapa as a monopolist, something that is now technically
possible under PBR. Actual implications would, of course, have to take into
account political considerations. In past years when little or no royalties were
collected, the value of Embrapa seed sales were essentially passed along to
cooperatives and foundations, or to farmers (and through them to consumers, both
Brazilian and international).
Second, the discounted value of sales differences between Embrapa and
Pharmacia is attributable to the different rates at which the improvements are
introduced onto the market. For the traditionally bred Embrapa varieties as noted,
an annualized 1% improvement is used, meaning the most productive (and highest
priced) variety is available only the 20th year. Biotech improvements on the other
hand are assumed to be introduced less frequently, but in larger increments. Note
that a greater productivity enhancement attributable to biotech, and/or more
frequent transformations and releases of new GMO varieties would create an even
greater discrepancy between the value of Embrapa and Pharmacia sales acting
alone (scenarios 1 and 2 in Table 2).
The same time path of effects of improvements can be seen in the combined
strategy (Scenario 3, Table 2) where there is only a relatively small difference
between the Pharmacia only and combined seed sales values. According to these
results, Embrapa sales could be enhanced between 0 and $479 million annually
($1,070 million - 591 million), depending on the deal struck with Pharmacia.
That, however, does not necessarily imply the maximum beneﬁt to Pharmacia
could be only $ 63 million ($1,070 million - 1,007 million) annually. The values
in Table 2, scenarios 1 and 2, are based on a 100% market share. Should
Pharmacia, operating in competition with Embrapa, achieve only a 50% share, its
average annual sales would be around $500 million ($1,007 m/2). Hence, the
value to Pharmacia of cooperating could be as much as $500 million annually, less
Table 2. Computed Sales and Prices for
Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Agreements








1. Embrapa alone 591.4 49.6 137
2. Pharmacia alone 1,007.0 84.5 233
3. Combined E&P 1,070.2 89.8 247
a Starting seed price was $540/mt or $36.3/ha.
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with Embrapa, and more if Embrapa priced at less than proﬁt maximizing rates,
capturing a greater market share under duopoly. The beneﬁts of cooperation
would be far smaller if the productivity beneﬁts of the Pharmacia technology were
nearer 15% than the 5% level used in the calculations. The results do, nonetheless,
indicate that Pharmacia (and presumably other private sector ﬁrms) do have viable
alternatives to collaborating with Embrapa. That is, the likely Embrapa value
could well fall short of expectations, which would be difﬁcult to accept and hence
delay negotiations.
Welfare effects of the productivity enhancements were calculated for both
Brazil and ROW. Productivity enhancements are modeled only for Brazil, and
ROW supply is assumed unchanged, as are other potential exogenous demand
shifters. Changes in the consumer surplus (DCS) and producer surplus (DPS) are
shown in Table 3. It should be noted that under the current no- or limited-royalty
policy for Embrapa, the total surplus, assuming the total Embrapa contribution is
passed on to consumers, is $591.4 million higher (the estimated average annual
monopoly seed sales value to Embrapa from Table 2) for a total of $632.8 million
(591.4 1 41.4). (Note that these calculations do not net out R&D costs or other
associated expenditures.) The actual allocation of the surplus between Brazilian
consumers and producers is not known, so that the tax-supported breeding at
Embrapa could largely be a transfer of beneﬁts from Brazilian taxpayers to
producers.
More signiﬁcant for planning at Embrapa, the combined strategy with Phar-
macia yields the highest Brazilian welfare surplus, while the Pharmacia-only
strategy yields the lowest. If Embrapa emphasizes its public role in negotiations,
it will seek the joint agreement even if most of the monetary beneﬁts were to be
directed to Pharmacia.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT DECISIONS IN THE PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SECTORS
Our results show that the marginal contribution to Pharmacia of licensing the
Embrapa varieties is, at the limit, rather modest, $535.1 2 $503.5 5 $31.6 million




D CS DPS DTotal D CS D PS DTotal
1. Embrapa alone 6.13 35.23 41.37 79.54 268.26 11.28
2. Pharmacia alone 3.84 21.55 25.39 49.76 243.11 6.65
3. Combined E&P 7.63 43.86 51.49 99.00 285.36 13.64
404 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 3/4/2001assuming equal sharing (Table 4). The dominant position is clearly the coopera-
tive one, but what share of sales revenue might Embrapa seek? If Embrapa put an
equal weight on sales and the surplus generated, then the value of the combined
position would be $1,070.2 million 1 51.5 5 $1,121.7 million. If in the absence
of an agreement Embrapa expected a maximum of a 50% market share, then the
revenue it would be willing to cede to Pharmacia would be $1,121.7 million 2
295.7 2 20.7 5 $805 million. From Pharmacia’s perspective, that sales ﬁgure
would correspond to an 80% market share if operating in competition (805/1,007),
which could be quite attractive. Those ﬁgures then could represent Embrapa’s
minimal acceptable position. Similar calculations can be made to establish other
negotiating bounds.
We believe one of the factors delaying the licensing of national varieties to
multinational agbiotech ﬁrms is uncertainty over the value of the improved
materials. The procedure presented here provides a mechanism for estimating
values to both parties, and hence for establishing bargaining positions. This may
assist in advancing the negotiating process. Other stumbling blocks exist as well.
One is the understandable suspicion with which many developing-country
policymakers view the economic power of major multinationals. Slowly, that
position seems to be adjusting to the inevitability of seeking private sector
cooperation as public funding continues to atrophy. Another factor is more
recent—the uncertainty of market access for GMOs. Calculating the effects of a
lower world price for GMOs can be accommodated readily within our model by
adjusting world price and share estimates. Developing those new estimates though
is another matter. Another factor particular to Brazil is the banning of GMO
soybean production by the state of Rio Grande do Sul. As for Embrapa and
Pharmacia, word is that negotiations continue, recently to include the possibility
of Embrapa licensing Pharmacia’s technologies rather than vice versa.
Acknowledgments: The authors are grateful for and would like to acknowledge the major
contributions of Dr. Maria Jose ´ Sampaio of Embrapa to the preparation of this article. We thank two
anonymous journal reviewers for their useful comments.
Table 4. Computed Bargaining Limits for Licensing





100% 50% 100% 50%
Non-Cooperative
Embrapa alone 591.4 295.7 41.4 20.7
Pharmacia alone 1007.0 503.5 25.4 12.7
Cooperative Combined E&P 1070.2 535.1
b 51.5
a Average annual seed sales and average annual total surplus change (Brazil), $ m.
b Equal share.
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